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This paper presents a game where the incumbent firm uses the price as a 
signal about demand size. Without observing the demand, the regulator has to 
decide if the entry of new firms will be allowed.  
  The game has a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the 
incumbent firm chooses the optimal price corresponding to low demand. With 
this strategy entry is deterred. 
With linear demand the pooling equilibrium is more likely to occur if 
the regulator expects a weaker form of competition. Besides, if there are two 
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How can regulated firms use their private information to induce 
the benevolent regulator in the protection of their markets from 
competition? Facing this potential behaviour from incumbent firms how 
should the benevolent regulator act? 
These are recurring questions both at political and theoretical 
levels (mainly in regulation and information literature). Frequently the 
regulator has the perception of hers lack of information about market or 
firm characteristics, but it is under those constraints that the regulator 
has to define the regulatory policy. 
The initial questions presented have some affinity with the Capture 
Theory (Stigler, 1971) since their core is the influence of firms on the 
regulator behaviour. However, our approach is different from Capture 
Theory because we are not considering the way incumbent firms 
influence regulator￿s objectives, but the way incumbent firms use to 
their own benefit the regulation policy, aiming at social welfare 
maximisation. 
The signalling game developed in this paper is described in terms 
of direct entry regulation. Direct entry regulation means that the 
regulator￿s decision about the number of firms in the industry and, from 
a pure theoretical view, can be opposed to indirect entry regulation, 
which means the regulator￿s decisions that influence the number of 
firms in the industry.
1 This opposition results from the fact that direct 
and indirect entry regulation emphasise different objectives: the former 
approach emphasises the excess entry problem, while the latter is 
essentially concerned about entry promotion and elimination of entry 
obstacles. In the present environment, where the main concerns are the 
privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation of industries, it might 
                                                 
1 This is the perspective adopted, for instance, by De Fraja (1997).   3
seem strange to describe the model in terms of direct entry regulation. 
However, we can advance several arguments, either theoretical or 
resulting from empirical observation, that support this perspective. A 
large number of firms might decrease social welfare, because of scale 
economies, network externalities, entry costs or business stealing 
effects but, from an individual standpoint, the industry can be 
attractive.  This is the Excess Entry Theory argument. Also, in recently 
privatised industries, with partial liberalisation, entry is gradual and 
controlled. That is happening in mobile telecommunications, for 
example, where new firms need the regulator￿s approval to entry. 
Before conceding licenses regulators define the number of firms that 
can operate in the industry. This is exactly what we designated by direct 
entry regulation. Additionally, the signal model developed in this paper 
can have a broader interpretation compatible with indirect entry 
regulation, as it will be refer later. 
In this paper we develop a model in which firms have private 
information about demand. There are many arguments to justify this 
type of asymmetric information. First, firms have a closer and more 
frequent contact with their customers. Second, firms have a superior 
knowledge of the quality of the products, and of the expected reaction 
of the customers to that same quality in terms of the quantity demanded 
at any price. Third, firms frequently devote significant resources to 
marketing studies (Lewis and Sappington, 1988). We will demonstrate 
that, under certain conditions, incumbent firms have incentives to 
influence the benevolent regulator￿s decision about entry, protecting 
their market from competition. This result might be due to private 
information about demand because with symmetric information the 
regulator would not deter entry. 
The signalling model developed in this paper is related with the 
literature of entry deterrence with asymmetric information, in particular 
with the model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982). However, Milgrom and 
Roberts model does not consider a regulated industry. From this 
perspective, the model of Kim (2001b) is closer to our model as it deals   4
specifically with direct entry regulation under asymmetric information. 
Our model introduces two main innovations in relation to Kim￿s model: 
the asymmetric information about demand, instead of private 
information about costs; and the adoption of a general approach, 
resulting from the absence of any constraint about the characteristics of 
demand, cost or oligopolistic behaviour. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) 
model inspired the general approach developed.  
The paper structure is the following: in section 2 it is described a 
model inspired on Mankiw and Whinston model of Excess Entry that 
shows how incumbent firms can use private information about demand 
to deter entry. To gain intuition into this conclusion it is presented, in 
section 3, a particular case assuming linear demand, no variable costs 
and only one entrant. In section 3.1 two games with different types of 
competition between firms in second period are compared. In section 
3.2 it is considered the existence of two incumbent firms in period 1. 
Section 4 presents the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. The Mankiw and Whinston model with asymmetric 
information and entry regulation 
 
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) proved that in an industry with 
homogeneous product, fixed costs of entry and in which ￿the 
equilibrium output per firm declines as the number of firms grows￿ 
(Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, p.49), that is the business stealing effect 
is present, free entry implies excess entry from a social point of view.  
We will show that in Mankiw and Whinston framework, the 
introduction of asymmetric information and entry regulation allow the 
incumbent firm to manipulate the regulator￿s decision about entry. This 
strategy leads to a small number of firms in the industry compared to 
the number that the regulator would allow if there were symmetric 
information about demand. 
The model assumes that the regulator does not know the demand 
but supposes, a priori, that demand can be low (D
L) or high (D
H), with   5
probability r and 1-r, respectively. Both in the case of D
L and D
H 
Mankiw and Whinston assumptions are valid: 
Assumption 1: NqN>ŇqŇ for all N>Ň and the limit of NqN when N 
tends to infinity is M<∞ (i.e., aggregate equilibrium output 
after entry, NqN, increases with the number of entrants (N) 
and approaches some finite bound); 
Assumption 2: qN<qŇ  for all N>Ň (firm output fall with entry:   
business stealing effect) 
Assumption 3: P(NqN)-c￿(qN)≥0 for all N (equilibrium price is not 
below marginal cost for any number of entrants). 
 
Because of the excess entry problem we assume that the regulator 
will define the maximum number of firms that can entry in the industry. 
If the regulator knew the demand the maximum number of firms would 
be n
L or n
















j) represents the 
measure of social welfare when demand is i (i=low or high) and the 
number of new firms authorised by the regulator is n
j (j=low or high). 
The main hypothesis of the paper is that the regulator does not 
know demand. But we assumed that the regulator before deciding how 
many new firms can enter observes the price defined by the incumbent 
firm, and considers it as a signal of demand size. The incumbent firm 
knows the regulator￿s decision process so the firm can choose the price 
strategically. 
Under the above hypothesis we will prove that choosing the 
optimal price corresponding to low demand, even if demand is high, 
belongs to a Perfect Bayesian pooling Equilibrium in a signalling game, 
under two requirements. The first requirement is that the fall in social 
welfare must be stronger when the regulator wrongly chooses n
H 
(because the optimal number is n
L) than when wrongly chooses n
L 
(because the optimal number is n
H). The second requirement is that the   6
incumbent firm must highly valuate the fact of sharing the market with 
a small number of firms.  
The Signaling Game 
 
Private information about demand and its effects on entry 
regulation will be formalized with a signal game with the following 
stages:  
i)  At moment zero Nature selects demand size, D
L or D
H with 
probability r and 1-r (with 0≤r≤1), respectively. The incumbent 
firm observes Nature choice.  
ii)  At period 1 the incumbent firm chooses the price.  
iii) At period 2 there are several firms that wish to enter regardless of 
the demand size. However, the regulator will define the maximum 
number of new firms to avoid excess entry. This number N will 
depend on the demand size perceived by regulator: it will be n
L if 
the regulator thinks that demand is low or n
H otherwise. 
Therefore, in period 2 the industry will be an oligopoly with N+1 
firms. 
iv) Finally, payoffs are received. Incumbent payoff will be the sum of 
profits of the two periods (supposing a discount factor of 1), the 
regulator￿s payoff will be measured by social welfare (defined as 
the sum of consumer surplus and firms profits in period 2), the 
entrants payoffs will be their profits in period 2. 
 




j) represents the monopolist profit in period 1 when demand is 
of type i (i=L or H) and price is p
j. If i=j the monopolist has the 
maximum profit, if i≠j the monopolist is giving up some profit. 
b) π2
i(n
j) represents the incumbent profit in period 2 when demand is 
i (i=L or H) and there are n
j (j=L or H) new firms. If i=j social 
welfare is maximized. If i≠j we can identify two cases:   7
-  i=L and j=H, i.e., demand is low but the regulator allows n
H 
new firms. In this case there will be excess entry, and entry 
will occur while profits are not negative or till N=n
H. 
-  i=H and j=L, i.e., demand is high but the regulador only 
allow n
L new firms. There will be insufficient entry but, 
from the incumbent point of view, this is a good situation 
because in period 2 there will be less competitors. 
c) p and q represent the updated beliefs of the regulator about the 
type of demand after observing the price. Hence, p represents the 
probability of low demand if price is P
H and q represents the 
probability of low demand if price is P
L. 
d) A pair of values represents the players￿ strategies. For incumbent 
firms (x,y) means that they choose price x if D
L and price y if D
H. 
For the regulator (w,z) means that she chooses to allow the entry 
of w new firms if the incumbent firm had choosen a price equal 







H), q=r, p] is a Perfect Bayesian 
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This pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (represented in the 
figure of the next page) can be described in the following way: 
whatever the demand size, the incumbent firm chooses the price that 
maximizes profit when demand is low. The regulator observes this price 
and updates her beliefs: the probability of low demand if the observed 
price is P
L becomes r and the probability of low demand if the observed 
price is P
H becomes p<p*. Then, the regulator allows the entry of n
L 
firms if the price is P
L or n
H firms if the price is P
H. 
   8




L) is an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent firm then 
the regulator￿s information set corresponding to P
L is on the equilibrium 
path, so the regulator￿s belief is updated by Bayes￿ rule and the 
incumbent strategy. Therefore q=r, the prior belief. Given this belief 
and the equilibrium strategy (P
L,P
L) the regulator best response 
following P
L is to choose n
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L)]   (3) 
 
The interpretation of condition (3) is straightforward: if period￿s 1 
price is P
L the regulator will choose n
L if the difference in social 
welfare for choosing the wrong number of new firms is bigger with low 
demand than with high demand, and the differences are weighted by the 
probability of each demand type. This corresponds to the first 
requirement of the existence of the pooling Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium as described above.  
2.To determine if the incumbent firm is willing to choose P
L to 
both demand sizes we need to compare the payoffs of choosing P
L with 
the payoffs of choosing P
H. To make this comparison we must specify 
how the regulator would react to P
H.  
If the regulator￿s response to P
H is n

















H, which is greater than the 





L). Then, if the regulator￿s 
response to P
H is n
L it is not possible to define the incumbent￿s strategy. 
If the regulator response to P
H is n






L, which is below the payoff corresponding to P
L, 
                                                 

























Then, if there is an equilibrium in which the incumbent￿s strategy 
is (P
L,P
L) the regulator￿s response to P
H m u s t  b e  n
H, because, under 
condition (4), we conclude that choosing P
L is always the best strategy 




Condition (4) represents the strong preference of the monopolist 
for sharing the market with few firms rather than with many firms, 
which seems quite intuitive. This expression corresponds to the second 
requirement for the existence of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We 
can interpret condition (4) by saying that the limit price strategy is 
attractive to the incumbent firm when demand is D
 H, i.e., the incumbent 
firm prefers to lose some profit in period 1 and share the market with 
few firms in period 2, than to maximize profit in period 1 and share the 
market with many firms in period 2.  
3.Finally, we must consider the regulator￿s belief at the 
information set corresponding to P
H and the optimality of choosing n
H 
given this belief. Choosing n
H is optimal for the regulator as a response 
to P























This condition provides that the updated belief p is sufficiently 




j) with i≠j, represents 
the damage on social welfare resulting from a wrong decision by the 
regulator, and as we consider that the fall in social welfare is stronger 
when the regulator wrongly chooses n
H than when wrongly chooses n
L, 
P* has a small value. ■ 
                                                 
3 Notice that we proved in 1 that the best response to P
L is n




L), and the corresponding Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium, has a central role in the present paper. This is the result of 
eliminating from the analysis all other strategies that could constitute a 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following justifications.  
First, it is important to notice that even with no threat of entry the 
incumbent firm would never choose prices greater than P
L if demand is 
D
L and/or prices greater than P
H if demand is D
H. Hence, with the 
possibility of entry, the incumbent firm will never consider to choose 
prices above the optimal level. 
Second, the strategy (P
L,P
H) can not be a separating Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium (with (n
L,n
H), q=1 and p=0 for regulator￿s strategy 
and beliefs) if condition (3) occurs. This is demonstrated in the 
Appendix. 





L requires additional conditions relative to the equilibrium (P
L,P
L). 
Also, under those conditions there are multiple equilibria because P
1 is 





L imply equilibra payoffs for the incumbent firm below the 
corresponding equilibria payoffs with (P
L,P
L), if the profit function in 
period 1 is monotonically increasing with price for P<P
H when D
H. This 






L can constitute a separating 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under some conditions described in the 
Appendix. However, we eliminate these strategies from the study using 
the same argument invoked in the preceding case: the fact that the 
equilibrium payoffs of the incumbent firm under the strategy (P
L,P
L) 
dominate those under (P
1,P
H)  for all P
1<P
L. 





H can not belong to a 
separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, even with (n
L,n
H), q=1 and 
p=0, because if D
H the incumbent firm has no incentive to choose 
                                                                                                                                            
verify. 
4 For a description of these equilibria see the Appendix.   11
P
2<P
H. For any P>P
L the regulator will allow the entry of n
H firms, so 
the best response is to maximise the profit in period 1 which implies the 
price P
H. Then we have the strategy (P
L,P
H) explained before. 
As the principal objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of 
asymmetric information on entry regulation, we will compare the final 
outcome of the pooling equilibrium with incumbent strategy (P
L,P
L) 
with the outcome that would be obtained if the regulator had symmetric 
information about demand. 
            W 1      W2    
Symmetric Information    
D
L   n
L     W
L(P




H   n








L   n
L     W
L(P
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If demand is D
L the asymmetric information does not have any 
impact on social welfare. However, if demand is D
H the regulator would 
like to have n
H more firms but, as a result of the incumbent strategy, the 
regulator will only allow n
L new firms. The asymmetric information 
creates a problem of insufficient entry if D
H.  
We described a situation where the regulator has to decide about 
entry and fears the problem of excess entry. At the same time the 
regulator has less information about demand than the incumbent firm. If 
demand is high these conditions induce the incumbent firm to adopt a 
limit price strategy and, in the end, the result can be insufficient entry. 
However, the pooling equilibrium motivated by asymmetric information 
about demand does not have only negative consequences in spite of the 
insufficient entry. The implementation of the limit price strategy has 
positive consequences in short run (period 1) resulting from the lower 









H).   12
In the description of the signal game we assumed that the role of 
the regulator was to decide how many new firms could operate in the 
industry. We label this as direct entry regulation. However, we can give 
a broader interpretation of the role of the regulator in the present game. 
We can consider that choosing n
j means that the regulator will take 
some actions to remove entry obstacles and to encourage the entry of n
j 
new firms. These actions will be more intensive if j is high. Then we 
can interpret the results of the signal game in the context of indirect 
entry regulation. With this interpretation we conclude that, in the 
pooling equilibrium described, the incumbent firm has the incentive to 
induce the regulator not to developed too intensive actions in the 
promotion of entry. 
We can illustrate this interpretation with an example from the 
European airline industry. In the late 1990s several alliances and 
mergers between airline companies occurred in Europe. According to 
the European legislation when mergers have economic consequences at 
European level, i.e. crossing the national level, they have to be 
authorised by the European Commission. Furthermore, when the 
companies involved in the mergers have a significant number of 
overlapping routes, the European Commission makes a detail analysis of 
the impact on competition. However, the European Commission only 
considers the hypothesis of adopting an active role in the merger 
process if the market demand has a significant size.
5 If the market 
demand is perceived as narrow, the European Commission does not take 
actions to encourage new entry, even if the merger creates a monopoly. 
When the market demand is significant and the merger can have 
important benefits (increase in efficiency, for example), the past 
approach of the European Commission has been to authorise the merger 
while, at the same time, imposing several obligations to incumbent 
firms in order to promote entry. These obligations can be to make 
                                                 
5 For example, in the Lufthansa/SAS process, the European Commission only 
considers in the analysis of competition routes with a capacity exceeding 30,000 
seats per year (Stragier, 2001).   13
available some landing and take-off slots at congested airports, to 
reduce the frequencies of some flights, to enter into interlining 
arrangements with the entrants, to open the frequent flyer programmes 
to the entrants customers, etc.
6 According to our model, if the 
incumbent firms can convince the Commission that market demand is 
low, the intensity of the obligations designed to promote entry might be 
weak, and then entry is less likely.  
The asymmetric information between firms and regulator plays a 
central role in the described process. Firms have a deeper knowledge of 
the market characteristics, and can manipulate many variables, 
including the price, as in the signal model presented above. In the 
airline industry firms can use the network definition as a powerful 
variable to manipulate the size of the demand perceived by outside 
entities. The substitution between direct and indirect flights (the ones 
with one or more stopovers) has a strong impact on the perceived 
demand size of each route.
7 
 
3. The model with linear demand, no variable costs and one entrant 
 
In the present section we will describe the previous signal game in 
a particular case in order to study two features: the impact of the type 
of competition between firms in period 2 if entry occurs, and the impact 
of the existence of two incumbent firms in period 1. In relation to the 
first point we will conclude that if the regulator expects a duopoly with 
a degree of competition quite distant from perfect competition, the 
pooling equilibrium described in proposition 1 is more likely to occur. 
In relation to the second point, we will conclude that even if there are 
two incumbent firms, the pooling strategy with the optimal price when 
demand is D
L belongs to a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.  
                                                 
6 For a detail description of the European Commission policy about airline mergers 
see Stragier (2001). 
7 In the United States there is evidence of this type of strategy of incumbent firms, 
which use the route definition as an instrumental variable, with the objective of 
deter entry (Transportation Research Board, 1999).   14
We will study the particular case characterized by linear demand 
(P=θ -Q), no variable costs and only one potential entrant. The 
parameter θ  can assume two values, θ
L or θ
H, representing low or high 
demand, respectively. 
 
3.1 Duopoly behaviour in period 2 
In this subsection we will study how the equilibrium outcome of 
the signal game depends on the type of competition assumed for period 
2 if entry occurs. We will compare two signal games that assume 
different oligopolist behaviour: Cournot and Stackelberg. In the 
description of these particular signal games we will use the following 
standard results: 
a) Monopoly with profit maximization 
Q=θ /2 P=θ /2   π =θ
2/4-F   W=  3/8(θ
2)-F  
b) Monopoly without profit maximization 
π =P(θ -P)-F   W=(θ -P)
2/2+ P(θ -P)-F 
c) Duopoly (Cournot) with profit maximization 




d) Duopoly (Stackelberg) with profit maximization 
q2=(θ-q1)/2    reaction function of firm 2 
q1=θ/2    q2=θ/4  P=θ/4 
Π1=θ
2/8-F   Π2=θ
2/16-F   W=  15θ
2/32-2F 
 
3.1.1 The Cournot signal game 
 
As the paper objective is to analyse the role of asymmetric 
information, the interesting situations are the ones where the regulator 
would behave differently if the demand size were known. These cases 





  Notice that if F is 
outside this range the regulator does not face any dilemma as long as 
the fixed cost is known. If F is too large, F>5/72(θ
H)
2, even if demand is   15
D
H, social welfare is higher with monopoly, and if F is too small,   
F<5/72(θ
L)
2, even with low demand social welfare is higher with two 
firms. Additionally, we impose that the entrant is always willing to 
enter in the market, so 9F≤(θ
L)
2. 
Applying proposition 1 to this particular case we conclude that 
[(θ
L/2,θ
L/2), (n=0, n=1), q=r, p] is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for 




2<72/5(F)         (3)C  





L/2)              (4)C 








3.1.2 The Stackelberg signal game 
 
To analyse the impact of a different type of competition, we will 
consider another game in all similar with the previous one, except the 
fact that, if entry occurs, competition will be of Stackelberg type. We 
assume that the incumbent firm (firm 1) will be the leader. 
In order to maintain the coherence with previous games it is 
necessary to assume that 16F≤(θ
L)
2. 
Applying proposition 1 to this particular case we conclude that 
[(θ
L/2,θ
L/2), (n=0, n=1), q=r, p] is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for 




2<32/3(F)         (3)S  





L/2)              (4)S 








Comparing the necessary conditions for the existence of the 
pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with (θ
L/2,θ
L/2) in the two 
signaling games, it is easier to verify the possibility to having values of 
F, q, θ
H and θ




2<32/3(F). Within this 
interval, if the regulator expects Cournot competition, entry will not be 
allowed. On the contrary, if the regulator expects Stackelberg 
competition, entry will be allowed and the pooling equilibrium as 
described will cease to exist. The interpretation of this result is quite   16
intuitive: if in period 2 competition is of Cournot type, the decrease in 
price does not compensate the higher fixed costs implied by the 
existence of two firms in the market. However, if competition is of 
Stackelberg type, the decrease in price will be greater and will 
compensate the double fixed cost. Hence, we conclude that the pooling 
equilibrium of proposition 1 is more robust if the regulator expects 
weaker forms of competition in period 2.  
 
3.2 Duopoly in period 1 
 
  In this subsection we will suppose that in period 1 there are two 
competing firms with Cornout behaviour. As before, we will assume 
that the regulator does not observe the quantities but can only observe 
the price, which continues to be the signal sent by the firms. Therefore, 
we will describe the game using as principal reference the price but 
having in mind that the decision variables of the firms are the 
quantities. 
In the description of the game we will use the following standard 
results: 
a) Duopoly Cournot without profit maximization 
q1=q2=0,5(θ￿P)
8    π =0,5(θ -P)P-F W=(θ -P)
2/2+ P(θ -P)-2F  
b) Oligopoly (three firms) with profit maximization 
qi=θ/4    i=1,2,3 
P=θ /4   π i=θ




As before, and to maintain the central hypothesis of the paper, we 









                                                 
8 qi represents firm￿s i output in oligopoly industries.   17
Proposition 2: [(θ
L/3,θ
L/3), (n=0, n=1), q=r, p]
9 is a Perfect 





2<288/7(F)         (3)D  





L/3))            (4)D 








The proof of proposition 2 is similar to proposition 1 and is 
described in the Appendix. 
The pooling equilibrium described in proposition 2 requires that 
incumbent firms choose the quantities that maximize the profit when 
demand is D
L even if demand is, in fact, D
H. Then, if demand is D
H, 
both incumbent firms are giving up some profit. This conclusion raises 
immediately the question about the incentive to deviate from the 
pooling strategy by one firm, supposing that the other firm will not 
deviate, in order to maximize the individual payoff. We will prove that 
this incentive does not exist, so the pooling strategy described in 
proposition 2 implies a tacit coordination between incumbents firms to 
induce entry regulation. 
In the proof we will use the following results of the game: 
a) If demand is D
H but both firms want θ
L/3 as the market price in 
period 1, in order to convince the regulator that demand is D
L, each firm 
must choose the quantity 0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3). According to the regulator￿s 







b)  Alternatively, if each firm decides to maximise the profit in 
period 1 without caring about regulatory policy, the individual quantity 
will be θ
H/3. In period 2 entry will be authorized and the individual 





                                                 
9 Notice that the incumbent firm strategy is described by the price but the decision 
variable of firms is the quantity. So, we must interpret the pair (θ
L/3,θ




H firms choose q1=q2=0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3), which imply the 
price θ
L/3.   18
According to condition (4)D, the payoff described in a) is greater 
than the payoff described in b). 
We will prove that in the signal game previously described it is not 
possible for one firm (firm 2) to find a value for q2 that implies a payoff 
greater than the one obtained with the pooling strategy, when the other 
firm decides to produce in period 1 the quantity of the pooling 
equilibrium (i.e., q1=0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3)). We can identify two different cases 
for the choice of q2: 
i) q2<0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3) and then P>θ
L/3, so entry will be allowed; 
ii) q2≥0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3) and then P≤θ
L/3, so entry will not be allowed. 
 
If firm 2 assumes q1=0,5(θ
H-θ
















L/3) the best choice for firm 2 is 
q2=(θ
H/4+θ


















L/3) the profit function is decreasing, so the best 
choice is q2=0,5(θ
H-θ
L/3). This option corresponds to the pooling 
equilibrium strategy. ■ 
 
We conclude that in the signal game described by proposition 2 
there is no incentive for any firm to deviate from the pooling 
equilibrium strategy. Then, in period 1 there is tacit collusion between 
the incumbents firms in order to induce the regulator to the decision of 
not allow entry. Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1999, p.109) argue 
that an increase in collusion between incumbent firms can be a negative 
consequence of entry regulation implemented to prevent excess entry. In 
our signalling game a tacit agreement between incumbent firms and   19
Cournot behaviour is enough to manipulate the regulators decision and 






The existence of asymmetric information about demand when the 
regulator has to decide about entry authorization creates the incentive 
for the incumbent firm to adopt a price strategy that induces the 
regulator in the protection of the market from competition. This 
equilibrium price strategy has two necessary conditions, both with 
intuitive interpretation: first, the regulator must have a greater aversion 
to make the wrong decision about entry when the decision is more 
liberal than when is stricter; second, the incumbent firm must highly 
valuate the fact of sharing the market with few firms. The overall result 
on welfare of this price strategy depends on the trade-off between short 
run benefits (resulting from the lower price) and long-run damages 
(resulting from the insufficient entry). 
For a particular case of the signal game developed (linear demand, 
no variable costs and one potential entrant), we conclude that the 
incumbent firm capacity of manipulating regulator￿s decision (through 
the implementation of the pooling equilibrium strategy analysed before) 
is weaker when the regulator has reasons to assume that the degree of 
competition will be high. Also, we conclude, for the particular case 
studied, that the existence of two incumbent firms does not change the 
previous conclusions, because the duopolists have incentives to tacitly 
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H) is an equilibrium strategy, both the regulator￿s 
information sets are on the equilibrium path, so the beliefs are updated 
by Bayes￿ rule and the incumbent strategy. Therefore, q=1 and p=0. 























Now we must check if (P
L,P
















L). Hence, there is no 




H, and the 




H), which, by condition (4), is below 
the payoff corresponding to P
L. Hence, if D
H there is an incentive for 
deviate. Therefore, (P
L,P
H) can not belong to a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium with the verification of condition (4). Only if condition (4) 
is not verified (P
L,P
H) can belong to a separating equilibrium in which 
the incumbent firm reveals the demand size. As the limit price strategy 
is not attractive when demand is high, the firm prefers to receive the 
monopoly profits of period 1 and share the market with many firms in 
second period. Rasmusen (2001, p.286) labels this separating 
equilibrium as no-strategic because the incumbent firm chooses the 
price that maximise the profit without caring about entry regulation. 
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1) is an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent firm then 
the regulator information set corresponding to P
L is on the equilibrium 
path, so the regulator￿s belief is updated by Bayes￿ rule and the 
incumbent strategy. Therefore q=r, the prior belief. Given this belief the 
regulator best response following P
1 is to choose n










H).    
 




2.To determine if the incumbent firm is willing to choose P
1 to 
both demand sizes we need to compare the payoffs from choosing P
1 
with the payoffs of choosing the alternative to P
1. As P
1 is lower than 
P
L,the alternative to P
1 is not equal to D
L and D
H: if D
L the alternative to 
P
1 is P
L while if D
H the alternative to P
1 is P
H.  
If the response to P>P
1 is n

















H, which is 





L) .Then, if (P
1,P
1) belongs 
to a equilibrium the regulator response to P>P
1 can not be n
L.  
If the response to P>P
1 is n











H. From the 
comparison of these payoffs with the corresponding payoffs when the 
incumbent firm chooses P




H when the regulator response to P>P
1 is n
H only 


















L)   23
Therefore, to have an equilibrium with (P
1,P
1) is necessary to 






H is the best response to P>P









L)   ⇒  P≤P*■ 
 





L required one more condition than the pooling 
equilibrium with (P
L,P
L). Furthermore, this result has another problem: 
there are many values of P
1 that verify the conditions mentioned above 
so there are multiple pooling equilibria of this type. An additional 




  and if the profit function in period 1 for D
H is monotonically 
decreasing for P
1<P
H, the equilibrium payoffs with (P
1,P
1) are below the 
equilibrium payoffs with (P
L,P
L). Hence, we conclude that the firm 
















L is an equilibrium strategy, then q=1 and p=0. 




It is necessary to verify if (P
1,P









L), which must 






































L). However, if these conditions are meet we have multiple 
                                                 
10 Note that in the equilibrium with (P
L,P
L) it was only required that the limit price 
strategy is attractive when demand is D
H.   24
equilibria because there are multiple values of P
1 that verify the 
conditions described.  





L, equilibrium payoffs of the incumbent firm are always 
below the equilibrium payoffs corresponding to the strategy (P
L,P
L) so 





that the equilibrium payoff corresponding to (P
L,P






L   (a) 





H   (b) 
and the equilibrium payoff corresponding to (P
1,P






L   (c) 





H   (d) 
 
As (a)>(c) and (b)>(d) by condition (4), the equilibrium with 
(P
L,P










L/3) is an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent firms 
then the regulator information set corresponding to θ
L/3 is on the 
equilibrium path, so the regulator￿s belief is updated by Bayes￿ rule and 
the incumbent strategy. Therefore q=r. Given this belief the regulator 
best response following θ

















2.To determine if the incumbent firms wants to choose the 
quantities that imply a price of θ
L/3, for both demand sizes, we need to 
compare the corresponding payoffs of choosing the quantities that imply 
a price of θ
H/3. To make this comparison we must specify how the 
regulator would react to θ
H/3.    25
If the regulator￿s response to θ
H/3 is n=0 the payoff of each 






L, which is below the 
payoff corresponding to θ





H, which is 
greater than the payoff corresponding to θ
L/3. 
If the regulator￿s response to θ
H/3 is n=1 the payoff of each   






L, which is below 
the payoff corresponding to θ


















2/9-F ⇒   





L/3    (4) D 
 
Then, if there is an equilibrium in which the incumbent strategy is 
(θ
L/3, θ
L/3) the regulator response to θ
H/3 must be n=1.  






H(n=0)   ⇒  
⇒     p≤[7/288(θ
H)
2-F] / [7/288((θ
H)
2-(θ
L)
2)].■ 
 
 